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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is vested in the Utah Supreme Court under Article
VIII, Section 3 of the Constitution of Utah and Rule 58A of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and pursuant to Rule 3 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
1.
Ferrebee's

Did the lower court err in finding that the appraisal of
appraiser, Phil Cook, is the best estimate

of

the

property's fair market value.
2.

Did Ferrebee sustain his burden of proof in establishing

a higher and better use of the property.
3.

Did

the

lower

court

err

in

finding

that

Ferrebee's

property wa$ entitled to an enhancement value for its proximity to
the airport.
4.

Did the lower court err in concluding that Ferrebee is

entitled to an enhancement value because his property is adjoining
the airport.
5.

Did the lower court err in admitting into evidence that

portion of Ferrebee's appraiser's report which was based on hearsay
or otherwise incompetent evidence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE;
Tooele County brought this action to condemn property held by

Ferrebee for use in the completion of the Tooele Valley Airport.
An Order of Immediate Possession was entered by the lower Court and
the

Ferrebee

property

was

completion of construction.

transferred

to

Tooele

County

for

Prior to trial, Ferrebee stipulated that the use to which the
property was being applied is a use authorized by law, that the
taking is necessary to such use, and that the public use to which
the property is being applied is a more necessary public use.

The

only issues for trial related to questions of valuation*
As part of his defense Ferrebee

raised

the issue of

the

application of the State and Federal Relocation Assistance Act,
contending

that

they had been

violated.

The

court

indicated

preliminarily that the Relocation Assistance Acts did not apply,
but permitted evidence to be put on to alleviate a retrial of the
case if the decision concerning the Relocation Assistance Act is
reversed or appealed.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This matter was

tried

beginning July 11, 1989.

to the Court

in a

four day

trial

The court entered its Bench Ruling upon

completion of the trial. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
were entered on April 30, 1990.

Record 408 (hereafter " R " ) .

A

copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are attached as
an addendum hereto.
1990.

R.414.

addendum.

The final Judgment was entered on June 18,

A copy of the final Judgment is attached in the

A Notice of Appeal was filed by plaintiff on the 6th day

of July, 1990 R.419, and a Notice of Cross-Appeal was filed by
Ferrebee on the 17th day of July, 1990.

2

R.423.

C.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL
At the conclusion of the four day trial, the lower court held

that the State and Federal Relocation Assistance Acts did not apply
to this case, and found that Ferrebee's appraisal submitted by J.
Philip

Cook,

property.

best

represented

the

fair

market

value

of

the

The lower court then awarded damages to Ferrebee based

on his appraisal in the amount of $74,000.00.
STATEMENT OF FACT
1.

In the late 60's and early 70's Tooele County decided to

develop an airport which would accommodate the landing of larger
aircraft than could be facilitated by the existing Tooele City
Airport.

R.435, at 10-18.

Funding was sought for the project

through FAA and state grants which were approved in 1974 and 1975.
R.435, at 18, 27, 29, 80.
2.

An original Airport Lay-out Plan, (hereafter "ALP") was

developed for the Tooele County Airport which located the airport
at its present site near Erda.
3.

R.435, at 17.

Pursuant to the original ALP, and its various amendments,

it was determined that aside from the "inholdings", i.e., those
pieces of property already owned by the County, additional property
would be required for development of the airport as contemplated by
the ALP.

R.435, at 18.

Parcels of property located in Erda were

acquired by Tooele County for the airport pursuant to negotiation
or condemnation and construction was begun on the airport in 1975.
R.435, at 175.
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4.

As originally contemplated

under the ALP, an 80 acre

parcel owned by Ferrebee was designated for use in construction of
the airport.

The ALP specifically

identified

68 acres of the

Ferrebee property to be used in the construction of the airport,
but since the remaining 12 acres constituted a 100' wide strip
running approximately the length of the airport, it was considered
to be an uneconomic remainder which had to be acquired by Tooele
County with the other property.

R.435, at 26, 34, 35, 62, 67, 148,

158, 160, 202, 207-8, 238.
5.

The County filed a condemnation action against Ferrebee

to condemn 37 acres of his property on May 24, 1979.

Only 37 acres

of the property was taken instead of the full 80 acres because of
budgetary restraints.

R.435, at 123.

The verdict awarded damages

to Ferrebee in the amount of $46,970.00 which included an award of
$21,070.00

for severance damages to Ferrebee's

R.435, at 271, Exhibit 68.

remaining

land.

The severance damages were calculated

at 70% of the value of the remaining 43.66 acres because the taking
left the property legally land-locked.
6.

Shortly

after

the

R.435, at 86.

completion

of

the

condemnation

proceedings, the County began negotiation with Ferrebee for the
acquisition of the remaining portion of his property.
125.

R.4 35, at

On or about December 3, 1981, the County by and through its

County Attorney transmitted a copy of an appraisal report prepared
by Jerry Webber for the 4 3.66 acres that remained of Ferrebee's
land.

R.440, at 824, 825.

Mr. Webber's appraisal established the

4

fair market value of the property at $1,750.00 per acre. R.437, at
348, Exhibit 4.
7.

Ferrebee rejected the Webber appraisal and indicated that

he was

considering

gifting the property

to the County if the

property could be valued at or near $10,000.00 per acre for the
purpose of the gift.
R.435, at 95.

R.435, at 180, 302-3, R.440, at 829-30,

Ferrebee requested a follow-up appraisal from his

appraiser, William L. Allsop.
County

agreed

to pay

for

R. 440, at 897, R. 439, at 867. The

the

additional

appraisal

prepared by Mr. Allsop on December 16, 1981.

which

was

By a letter dated

December 29, 1981, the County Attorney, Ron Elton transmitted the
Allsop appraisal to Ferrebee.

R.440, at 830, Exhibit 83.

The

Allsop appraisal assessed the fair market value of the Ferrebee
property

at

$4,500.00

per acre, a value

the County

rejected.

R.440, at 880, 830, Exhibit 83; R.435, at 200-1.
8.

From

1982 until

late

1984, the

County

continued

to

express interest in the acquisition of the Ferrebee property but
the County did not have sufficient funds to purchase the property.
R.435, at 89.
9.

In the original application submitted by the County for

a federal grant to develop the Tooele Valley Airport, the County
budgeted the amount necessary for the acquisition of the Ferrebee
property, based on the Webber $1,750.00 per acre appraisal. R.435,
at 205. That budget was subsequently amended to reflect changes in
the appraised value of the property.

5

R.435, at 281.

10.

At

the

beginning

of

1985, the

efforts to acquire the Ferrebee property.

County

continued

its

Because of the changing

economic conditions of the County, and the time that had passed
since the prior appraisal in 1981, and because the County was aware
that the FAA grant would require a current appraisal, the County
retained Mr. Webber to prepare an updated appraisal of the Ferrebee
propeOty.

R.435, at 101-4.

Mr. Webber's updated appraisal for the

Subject Property which valued the property at $275.00 per acre.
R.437, at 370, Exhibit 11.
11.

Mr. Webber's appraisal indicated that the reason for the

drop in value of the property from $1,750.00 per acre to $275.00
per acre was based on the fact that property prices generally in
the area had dropped by approximately 50%, and because the property
was landlocked, an adjustment which had not been made fully before.
R. 437, at 352-62.
12.

Pursuant

to

FAA

requirements

that

a

review

of

an

appraisal be made, and because of the substantial decrease in value
as evidenced

by the $275.00 per acre appraisal, Tooele County

retained a review appraiser, George Y. Fujii to review and comment
on the second Webber appraisal.
13.

R.435, at 101-5, 205-6.

On June 27, 1985, Mr. Fujii prepared and delivered to

Tooele County, a letter reviewing the Webber appraisal.
491,

Exhibit

15.

The County

provided

R.437, at

a copy of Mr. Fujii's

critique to Mr. Webber, and requested that Mr. Webber respond.
R.435, at 105.

Mr. Webber responded to Mr. Fujii's critique in

writing on August 20, 1985.

R.437, at 391, Exhibit 13.
6

Based on

the response by Mr. Webber, Tooele County was satisfied that the
Webber appraisal was a fair estimate of the value of the Ferrebee
property.
14.

R.435, at 106.
On February 28, 1986, the County offered to purchase the

Ferrebee property based upon the Webber $275.00 per acre appraisal,
or $12,000.
15.

R.435, at 119, Exhibit 12.

Again, on March 3, 1986, the County offered to purchase

the Subject Property for $275.00 per acre and offered an additional
$200.00 per acre as an incentive to avoid litigation.
109-10.
16.
action.

R.435, at

Mr. Ferrebee refused the County's offers.
On May 16, 1986, the County filed its Complaint in this
R.l.

At that same time, the County moved for immediate

occupancy of the property pursuant to statute and deposited with
the County 75% of the appraised value of the property or $9,004.87.
Ferrebee stipulated to the County's motion for immediate occupancy.
R.9-14, 18-22.
17.
value

of

At trial, plaintiff offered evidence of the fair market
the

property

by

providing

to

the

court

appraisal, and the appraisal of George Y. Fujii.

the

Webber

R.437, at 370,

Exhibit 11; R.438, at 554, Exhibit 17.
18.

Like Mr. Webber, Mr. Fujii determined that the highest

and best use of the Ferrebee Property was its existing agricultural
use.

R.438, at 554, Exhibit 17.

The property is zone A-20 which

permits only agricultural use with residential development on 20
acre parcels.

_Icl. As long as Ferrebee has owned the property, it

has been used only for marginal pasture.
7

R.439, at 652-55.

19.

In determining the properties fair market value, Mr.

Fujii used the comparable sale approach and analyzed 10 comparable
sales making adjustments to each sale for differences in zoning,
location, characteristics, frontage, and soil type. R.439, at 554,
Exhibit 17, pp. 15-18.

Mr. Fujii examined the Ferrebee property

and found that it could be broken into three different areas based
on its agricultural use.

_Id. , pp. 23-25.

Mr. Fujii determined

that 10 acres was potentially cultivatable land with the remaining
33.66 acres fit only for use as pasture.

Along with the property,

Ferrebee also owned certain water rights which augmented the value
of the property.

Ferrebee owned 10 acres of undeveloped irrigation

or well water, and 20 acres of undeveloped drain water.

.Ici. Mr.

Fujii applied the good irrigation water to the 10 acres that had
cultivation potential and determined that with the water it had a
value of $1250 per acre.
water

did

not

have

the

JEci.
same

Mr. Fujii determined that drain
value

as

irrigation

water,

and

determined that as it would be applied to the remaining 30 acres of
pasture land, it would increase the value of that land only by
$100.00 per acre, including the water.

Jlci.

pasture land was valued at $600 per acre.

That less valuable
JEd..

13.66 acres of

pasture land that remained with out water was valued at $400.00 per
acre.
of

the

_Id.

Mr. Fujii determined that the total fair market value

property

was

$29,964.

JEd.

Because

the property

was

landlocked, an adjustment of $19,400 was appropriate leaving a
value of the property of $10,600.

8

Id, at 22.

20.

Ferrebee

provided

three

appraisals

prepared

by

two

different appraisers, Mr. Phillip A. Snell and Mr. J. Philip Cook.
R.439, at 295.

Mr. Snell's first appraisal determined that the

property's highest and best use was the existing agricultural use,
and valued all of the property at the same price per acre, $1,900
per acre or $85,000.00.
Snell

used

the

R.439, at 795, Exhibit 21, p. iv.

comparable

sales

approach

and

made

Mr.

specific

adjustments of specific sales for zoning, size, frontage, soil
type, and water rights. Id.f at pp. 13-14.

Mr. Snell did not make

any adjustment for the property being landlocked.

JA.

Mr. Snell

also!made no adjustment for the property's proximity to the airport
finding that it had no particular impact on land values.

JEd., p.

6.
21.

Mr. Snell provided a second appraisal which departed from

his first appraisal both in approach and conclusion.

R.439, at

795, Exhibit 21. Mr. Snell changed his determination as to highest
and best use finding that the Ferrebee's property had a highest and
best use that was "interim, agricultural with ultimate usage for
expansion
related

of

the Tooele Valley

usage."

airport or

Id../ at p. iv.

some other

airport

Mr. Snell again used

the

comparable sales approach but departed from the approach by not
making any adjustments to the nineteen comparable sales identified.
Fifteen sales were by one seller, Terracor, which he determined to
be distressed sales, Ld. , at p. 23, and four were by other sellers.
Id.

Mr. Snell averaged the Terracor sales, i.e. the sum of all

sales divided by the total acreage, and adjusted that total upward
9

by

30% because of the distressed

sales.

averaged the remaining four sales.

JEd.

_Id.

Mr. Snell then

From these averages, Mr.

Snell determined that the "Ferrebee property (with the exception of
airport influences) is $1,153.00" per acre.
22.

Mr.

Snell

then

proposed

an

Id.

adjustment

for

"airport

influence" based on comparable sales of property adjoining other
rural airports in Utah, Colorado, and Kansas.
Exhibit

23, pp.

15-23.

Approach", Mr. Snell

While

ostensibly

identified

specific

a

R.439, at 795,
"Sales

Comparison

sales of property

to

municipalities for use in expansion of their airports. All but one
of the sales were by condemnation or under threat of condemnation.
R.439, at 766.

Mr. Snell then allegedly inquired of individuals,

whose qualifications were unknown, R.439, at 768-787, to determine
what "similar property" away from the airport sold for.
Exhibit 23, pp. 19-21.
sales with

R.439,

Mr. Snell then compared the identified

the price for "similar property" no

adjoining

the

airports to arrive at a percentage figure which he characterized as
an "airport influence."

JOd. , p. 21.

He multiplied this airport

influence factor, in this case 100%, to the value of the Ferrebee
property arrive at a fair market value of $2,306.00 per acre or
$100,000.00.

Id.., p. 24.

In his second appraisal, Mr. Snell made

no adjustment for the property being landlocked.
23.

Mr.

Cook

used

a

similar

determining fair market value.

approach

to Mr.

Snell

in

R.434, at 11, Exhibits 91 and 92.

Mr. Cook used allegedly comparable sales data to analyze the value
of the Ferrebee property and determined
10

that the value of the

property was $74,000.00.

JTd.

In reaching this conclusion, Mr.

Cook analyzed the Ferrebee property and determined that its highest
and best use was" agricultural on an interim basis with speculation
for future use in conjunction with the airport."

_Id..

Mr. Cook

then used comparable sales data from sales of land in Tooele County
to determine that the property had a "based agricultural value" of
$1,500.00 per acre for 30 acres and $500.00 per acre for 13.66
acres for a total base agricultural value of $52,000.00. Id../ pp.
40,

44.

Specifically, Mr. Cook determined

that

the

Ferrebee

property was worth $500.00 per acre without water, and that an
adjustment of $1,000.00 per acre was necessary for 30 acres of the
property because of the 10 acres of well water and 20 acres of
drain water rights Ferrebee held. JA.

Mr. Cook determined that

well water and drain water should be valued the same at $1,000.00
per

acre.

R.434,

at

99.

Mr.

Cook

discounted

this

"base

agricultural value" by 37% or $19,240.00 because it was landlocked,
leaving a discounted base agricultural value of $32,760.00. R.434,
Exhibit

91,

agricultural

pp.

40-2.

value

Mr.

or

base

JId., p. 44.

The

125%

basis

the

justified

$40,950.00

this

property was situated contiguous to the airport.
was

125%

adjusted

the

figure

by

then

because

enhancement

upward

Cook

on

the

that

Ferrebee property was enhanced because of its proximity to the
airport, and because of the County's need for the property in the
future.
24.

R.434, at 170, 192.
Mr. Cook established his "airport proximity enhancement"

factor by taking the information from Mr. Snell's appraisal R.434,
11

at 163, and comparing "sales of land located adjacent to airports
in the Intermountain Region . . . with similar property lacking the
adjacent airport location."

R.434, Exhibit 91, pp. 42-43.

Opinion

concerning the value "similar property lacking the adjacent airport
location" was taken from individuals with unknown qualifications.
R.434, at

167-8.

From the comparison, Mr. Cook arrived at a

"premium paid by the County or airport authority when acquiring
land adjacent to airports for expansion purposes."
91, p. 43.

R.434, Exhibit

The enhancement figure arrived at by Mr. Cook was 125%

of the "based agricultural value."

JLci. , at 44.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The lower court erroneously based its finding of fair market
value on the appraisal of Ferrebee's appraiser, J. Philip Cook, and
erroneously concluded that the Ferrebee property was entitled to an
enhancement value based on its more proximity to the airport.
Ferrebee failed to carry his burden of proof establishing a
higher and better use than the agricultural use the property is
currently

and

has

historically

been

used

for.

Specifically,

Ferrebee failed to establish a legal feasibility of his proposed
higher and better use by failing to show that the zoning would be
changed

to

property.

accommodate

such

a

higher

and

better

use

of

the

The evidence before the lower court demonstrated that

since Ferrebee's property was to be used in the physical layout of
the airport, including use in the taxiways and apron it would be
impossible to get the County to zone the property to permit an
enhanced private use.
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Ferrebee, also, failed to establish)an economic feasibility
for his proposed higher and better use.
to

demonstrate

enhanced

use

a realistic, viable
for

commercial

appraisers who testified

or

No evidence was provided

market

for

industrial

conceded

that

use.

the

properties
All

there was no

of

the

financial

demand for development property near the airport.
The Cook appraisal, relied upon by the lower court to assess
fair market value, improperly calculated fair market value based on
"enhancement factor" which was based on the County's need for the
property.

The Cook appraisal calculated a "premium" that Ferrebee

could expect to receive from Tooele County because it needed the
Ferrebee property to complete the airport.

A consideration of the

enhanced value of the property created by the condemning agencies
activities in the market place is not proper in determining fair
market value as a matter of law.
Finally, the evidence submitted by Ferrebee's appraisers to
establish the "enhancement value" or "premium" to be extracted from
Tooele County because of its need for the property was erroneously
admitted

by

objectionable
condemnation
inadmissible.

the

lower

evidence
or

under

court

over

consisted
threat

of

counsels'
of

sales

objections.
completed

condemnation

and

The

through
are

thus

In addition, the essential analysis in arriving at

the "enhancement" value was the comparison of certain identified
sales of property to municipalities for use in expanding existing
airports, with "similar" property in those areas that were not next
to the airport.

The process of determining the comparability or
13

similarity

of

the

properties

Ferrebee's appraisers.

compared

was

not

performed

by

Ferrebee's appraisers offered as evidence

the opinions of others whose qualifications were unknown as to the
value

of

other

"similar" property

for use

"premium" for property next to the airports.
is

impermissible

hearsay,

which

essential issue of comparability.

puts

in

calculating

the

This type of evidence

beyond

examination

the

The lower court should have

stricken that evidence, but failed to do so.
LEGAL ARGUMENT
This

appeal

addresses

certain

issues

concerning

the

sufficiency of evidence to support the lower court's finding of
fact as to the fair market value of the Ferrebee property and
concerning the lower court's conclusion of law that the property is
entitled to an enhancement value based on its proximity to the
Tooele Valley airport.
Both legal conclusions and factual findings are assigned as
error in this case.
that

The standard of review for errors of law is

"[a] trial court's conclusions are accorded no particular

deference" and they are reviewed

for

"correctness."

Bellon v.

Malner, 157 Utah Adv. Rp. 41, 42 (March 29, 1991), citing Grayson
Paper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P. 2d 467, 470

(Utah 1989).

With

regard to a trial court's finding of fact they "will not be set
aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous."
52(a).
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.Id.; Utah R. Civ. P

I.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING FERREBEE'S APPRAISAL AS ITS
BASIS FOR ASSESSING FAIR MARKET VALUE.
Article I, §22 of the Utah Constitution provides that "private

property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just
compensation."

The determination of

just compensation for the

taking of real property for a public use is determined by assessing
the fair market value of the property at the time of the taking.
See §78-34-11 of the Utah Code Annotated

(for the purpose of

assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto shall be
deemed to have accrued at the date of the service of summons . .
. " ) ; Southern Pacific Company vs. Arthur, 352 P.2d 693 (Utah 1960).
Fair market value has been defined

in many ways, however, the

generally accepted definition is)"what . . .

a purchaser, willing

to buy but not required to so, pay, and what

. . .

willing to sell but not required to do so, ask".
305 P.2d

495, 498

(Utah

1957), Utah

a seller,

State v. Noble,

State Road

Commission v.

Freeberq, 687 P.2d 827 (Utah 1984).
The lower court found that "[t]he appraisal of Phil Cook,
Ferrebee's appraiser, is the best estimate of the fair market value
of the Subject Property, and was adopted by the Court as the true
market value of the Subject Property."

R.410.

That finding by the

court is against the clear weight of evidence.

Ferrebee failed to

carry his burden of proof as to the higher and better use proposed
by the Cook appraisal, and the Cook appraisal improperly bases its
fair

market

valuation

on

supportable in law or fact.

an

enhancement

value

that

is

not

The lower court also erred in its

conclusion that "Ferrebee is entitle" to be paid the fair market
15

value of the Subject Property . . . as enhanced by its proximity to
the airport."

R.412.

In addition, the Cook appraisal is based on

incompetent, hearsay evidence which the lower court erroneously
failed to exclude.
The findings and conclusions of the lower court as to the fair
market value of the Ferrebee property should be rejected and the
matter remanded to the District Court for the entry of findings
consistent with the appraisals provided by Tooele County.
A.

FERREBEE FAILED TO CARRY HIS BURDEN OF PROOF TO ESTABLISH
A HIGH AND BETTER USE.

Analysis of fair market value is generally calculated at the
present use of the land, unless the condemnee can establish a
better use.

Brinkerhoff, Eminent Domain: Proving Highest and Best

Use of Undeveloped Land In Utah, 1973 Utah L. Review, 705 (1973)
(hereafter

"Brinkerhoff").

Thus, where there is a discrepancy

between the condemnor and condemnee as to the use of the property,
the burden is upon the condemnee to show a higher and better use
for the property which will increase the value of the property
commensurately.

Movie v. Salt Lake City, 176 P. 2d 582 (Utah 1947).

While the condemnee is entitled to valuation of his property
applied to the highest and best use to which it could be put at the
time of the taking, evidence of the highest and best use, or "its
projected use, affecting value, "must be not only possible, but
reasonably

probably.

It must

not

be merely

in the realm of

speculation because the land is adaptable to a particular use in
the remote and uncertain future."
464 (Utah 1964).

State v. Jacobs, 397 P.2d 463,

The court may consider a higher and better use of
16

the property other than the present use only when the condemnee
proves three elements of feasibility with respect to the higher and
best use: (1) physical feasibility, i.e., is the land adaptable to
the

suggested

use?

(2)

legal

feasibility,

i.e.,

is

the

land

available for the suggest use? (3) economic feasibility, i.e., is
there demand for the suggested use?r Weiss, The Effect of Zoning on
Market Value, Seventh Institute on Eminent Domain 28 (1967), 4
Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain, §12,322[2], note 5 (3rd Edition),
Brinkerhoff, supra, at 708.

Failure to prove any one of the three

elements of feasibility defeats the contended higher and better
use, and the fair market value of the property must be determined
at its existing use.

State v. Jacobs, supra; Liere v. State, 333

N.Y.S.2d 266 (New York 1972); Brinkerhoff, supra.
The evidence before the lower court from all of the appraisers
who

testified

or

otherwise

presented

evidence

is

that

the

property's current use is consistent with its A-20 zoning, i.e., an
agricultural use permitting one farm residence for every twenty
acres.

R.434, at 11, Exhibit 91, pp. 20-23; R.439, 629.

In

addition, testimony of both Ferrebee and his tenant on the property
disclose that for the last fifty-five years the property has keen
used for nothing but pasture.

The properties agricultural use is

limited to its existing grazing use because of the high alkaline
content

of

the

soil, and

its high water

proximity to the Great Salt Lake.

of

it

R.434, at 11, Exhibit 91, pp.

20-21; R.437, at 491, Exhibit 17, pp. 10-12.
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table because

Tooele County's appraisers Messrs. Fujii and Webber valued the
Ferrebee property based on its highest and best use as agricultural
indicating that approximately 25% of the land might be used for
cultivation with the remaining 75% being used only for marginal
pasture.
Ferrebee's

appraiser, Phillip

Snell, initially valued

the

property based on the same highest and best use, agricultural, but
then some three years later changed his appraisal claiming the
highest and best use as "interim, agricultural with)ultimate usage
for expansion of the Tooele Valley airport or some other airport
related usage."
valued

the

Similarly, Ferrebee's second appraiser, Phil Cook,

property

based

on

a

highest

and

best

use

as

"agricultural with speculation for future use in conjunction with
the airport."

It is Ferrebee's burden of proof, therefore, to

establish this higher and better use.
Ferrebee failed to carry his burden of proof as to the alleged
higher and better use by failing to establish any legal or economic
feasibility for that use.

In fact, all of the evidence before the

lower court clearly established that it was highly unlikely that
zoning would have been changed to permit private development of the
land, and

that there was absolutely

no demand

for use of

the

property in conjunction with the airport.
(1)
Legal

THE FERREBEE PROPERTY LEGALLY COULD NOT BE USED FOR
ANYTHING OTHER THAN ITS EXISTING AGRICULTURAL USE.

feasibility involves a determination of whether the

restrictions on land, both governmental and private would permit a
contended

higher

and

better

use.
18

Most

important

in

this

determination is the zoning of the property.
at 710.

Brinkerhoff, supra,

If property is restricted by zoning to a particular use,

property value must generally be based upon that use only.

Id.

As indicated above the Ferrebee property was zoned A-20 and
had limited development potential under that designation to one
residential

dwelling

for every

twenty acres.

R.437, at 491,

Exhibit 17, p.10; R.434, at 11, Exhibit 91, p. 24.
better

use

contemplated

by

Ferrebee's

The higher and

appraisers

would

have

required a zoning change to some industrial or commercial zoning,
yet Ferrebee offered absolutely no evidence as to the possibility
or likelihood of a zoning change for any higher or better use.
The Ferrebee property is within the airport development plan
and was always projected for taking by the County.
the

County

Director

of

Development

established

Testimony of
that

it

was

extremely unlikely that any enhanced private use of Ferrebee's
property would be approved or permitted by Tooele County which is
inconsistent with the use of the property as part of the airport.
R.435, at 59, pp. 186-7.

It should also be noted that Ferrebee's

property was to be used as part of the airport taxi strip and
apron, thus this property was a fundamental part of the development
plan and could not be realistically developed for any private use
in connection with the airport.

Thus, any request for development

of the Ferrebee property would have been in direct conflict with
its projected use as part of the airport improvements.
Ferrebee completely failed to carry his burden of proof as to
the legal feasibility of the proposed higher and better use, and
19

thus, the Court should reject the lower court's finding that Phil
Cook's appraisal based on that unsubstantiated higher and better
use is the best estimate of fair market value.
(2)

Brinkerhoff, supra.

THERE IS NO DEMAND FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
FERREBEE
PROPERTY
TO
SUPPORT
THE
ECONOMIC
FEASIBILITY OF A HIGHER AND BETTER USE.

Economic feasibility focuses on whether, in fact, there is a
real need, or demand

for the contended higher and better use.

State v. Tedesco, 291 P. 2d 1028 (1956).
burden

of

proof

as

In order to carry his

to a higher or better

use, Ferrebee

must

demonstrate a "viable market" for the proposed use at the time of
the condemnation.

State v. Hopkins, 506 P. 2d 57 (Utah 1973), State

v. Tedesco, supra, Redevelopment v. Mitsui, 522 P.2d 1370, 1372
(Utah

19 74)

("the

value

of

the

condemned

property

is

to

be

determined as of the date and under the circumstances existing at
the time of the taking and that ordinarily evidence of subsequent
occurrences is not admissible or bearing thereon.")

No evidence

was presented to the lower court that would indicate any interest
in development of any land next to or near the airport at the time
of this taking in 1986.

In fact, the evidence establishes exactly

the opposite.
Ferrebee's first appraiser, Mr. Snell, concluded in his first
appraisal that "[p]resently [the airport] is being used more for
recreational activity than for business or community service.

It

is not considered to be a viable force affecting the economy or
land values in the vicinity."

R.439, at 795, Exhibit 21, p. 6.

Ferrebee's second appraiser, Phil Cook, also conceded he was not
20

aware of any demand from any entrepreneur or other developer to
acquire

and

develop

either

property near the airport.

commercially

or

R.434, at 128.

industrially

any

Thus, Ferrebee could

point to no "viable market" for the proposed higher and better use
at the time of the condemnation.
The only evidence offered by Ferrebee relating to any demand
for the development of the area around the airport were rumors Mr.
Cook heard three years after the date of the taking concerning Salt
Lake

International's

reliever airport

interest

in

acquiring

the

airport

as

, R.434, at 119-126, and the possibility

a

the

airport would expand based on studies that had been prepared by the
FAA.

Id.
Specifically, in his appraisal Mr. Cook wrote:
As to demand, the appraiser has reviewed studies prepared by
Tooele County, the Wasatch Front Regional Counsel and
Mountainlands Association of Governments, concerning airports
along the Wasatch Front. Briefly, these studies indicate that
the Tooele Valley Airport should ultimately be upgraded from
its current status as a basic utility airport to a reliever
airport for Salt Lake International.
While current demand
does not justify this, the study is obviously forward
thinking.

R.434, at 11, Exhibit 91, p. 28.
In addition, Mr. Cook considered the possibility that the property
might be developed with a through-the-fence access to the airport,
i.e., direct access to the airport through the boundary fence, but
then conceded that the preferred method of developing through-thefence developments is for the County to buy the property and lease
it back to the developer. JId.

Such speculative development would

not increase the fair market value of the property.
21

The rumors referred to by Mr. Cook were those heard in 19 89,
three

years

after

the

filing

of

this

suit.

The

County's

Development Director testified that the interest reflected in the
rumors were recent and no. inquiries or interest was shown in the
airport by Salt Lake International during the relevant time period
in 1986.

R.435, at 136-37.

Thus, the rumors and the conclusions

reached based on those rumors are at best speculative and do not
indicate any viable market for the proposed use.

Finally, the

acquisition of Tooele County Airport by Salt Lake International
does not necessarily create an immediate need or market for the
Ferrebee property at some higher or better use.

Ferrebee provided

no evidence to establish an increased market even!if the airport
was acquired by Salt Lake International.
Finally, the reports)referred to by Cook relating to airport
expansion were repudiated by Tooele County as being unrealistic,
and having no basis in fact.

R.435, at 143, 153.

Tooele County

provided specific evidence to the court that for years it tried to
lease 11 acres of the airport property which had been set aside for
lease development and after exhaustive efforts did not receive one
single offer to commercially
airport.

R.435, at

305-6.

lease or develop any part of the
There was

clearly

development property at the time of the taking.

no demand

for

R.435, at 155.

In short, the clear weight of the evidence established that in
1986, at the time of the taking, there was9no interest in private
or quasi public development of any part of the airport. R.434, at
127.

Ferrebee

failed to carry his burden of proof as to the
22

economic feasibility of a higher and better use for his property,
and thus the lower court's finding of fair market value based
Ferrebee's appraisals premised on this higher or better use must be
rejected.
B.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT FERREBEE'S
PROPERTY IS ENTITLED TO AN ENHANCEMENT VALUE BECAUSE OF
ITS PROXIMITY TO THE AIRPORT.

In the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the
court found that the "fair market value of the property is enhanced
by its proximity to the initial construction of the airport" R.413,
and concluded that "Ferrebee is entitled to be paid the fair market
value of the Subject Property . . . as enhanced by its proximity to
the airport."

R.414.

Under the facts of this case, the court

erred in concluding that the property was enhanced by its proximity
to the airport, and the court's finding that an enhancement value
was appropriate is against the clear weight of the evidence.

In

addition the lower court erred in fail nh to exclude evidence
concerning the alleged enhancement value since it was based on
incompetent, hearsay evidence.
Ferrebee submits that his property is unique because of its
proximity }o the airport and that special consideration should be
given to an enhancement of the property because of its location.
Specifically,

Ferrebee's

appraiser,

Phil

Cook,

wrote

in

his

appraisal that
the subject is a unique property as to proximity to the east
side of the airport, and consequently has potential for use in
conjunction with the airport, either privately or publicly.
There is limited demand at present for use of this land. With
the published projections of future demand, related primarily
to excess demand at Salt Lake International as opposed to
23

demand inherent within Tooele County, these factors translate
to speculative value."
R.434, at 11, Exhibit 91, p. 29.
The analysis employed by Ferrebee's appraisers Cook and Snell
to enhance the property by its proximity to the airport was to
first establish a "base agricultural value" of the property by the
comparable sales approach, i.e., comparing Ferrebee's property to
other sales of agricultural property in or about Tooele County
without considering the influences of the airport.
agricultural

value"

is

established,

the

"airport

factor" was applied as a percentage adjustment.

Once a "base
enhancement

This percentage

adjustment was arrived at by using a comparable sales approach but
not in the standard way.

Ferrebee's appraisers made comparison not

between specifically identified comparable sales and the Ferrebee
property, something they conceded could not be done, but made a
comparison between sales of property located next to other airports
and

"similar" property in the same area

airport location."

"lacking

the adjacent

R.434, at 11, Exhibit 91, p. 43.

Mr. Cook

noted in his appraisal that,
It should be noted that the airports are generally
located in rural communities surrounded by agricultural
property . . .
The following table shows the premium paid by the
county or airport authority when acquiring land adjacent
to airports for expansion purposes.
Two of the six
transactions were made under condemnation and are awards
dictated by the court.
These two transactions should
therefore be considered cautiously. (emphasis added)
Id.
Critical to Ferrebee's appraiser's technique was comparing the
identified purchase prior to what "similar agricultural ground not
24

adjoining the airport has sold or is available for . . . "
42.

Jd. , p.

To arrive at what "similar agricultural ground not adjoining

the airport has sold or is available for" the Ferrebee' s appraisers
did not review any specific comparable, or inspect any property,
instead the appraisers solicited opinions from individuals in those
areas for an estimate of value of "similar" property.
165-68.
22%

to

R.434, at

Predictably the opinions as to the value ranged wildly,
365%, which

was

then

conservatively

appraiser to reflect a "premium" of 125%.
91, p. 44.

estimated

by

the

R.434, at 11, Exhibit

That percentage was applied to the "base agricultural

value" to more than double the final fair market value of the
Ferrebee property.
Ferrebee's appraisers contend that the enhancement factor is
necessary because of "future private development" or
future public use."

R.434, at 119.

"potential

Neither of these uses are

warranted by the facts in this case, and the lower court erred as
a matter of law in permitting evidence of future public use as
enhancing the value of the property.
(1)

THERE
IS
NO
EVIDENCE
TO
SUPPORT
ANY
ENHANCEMENT BASED ON PRIVATE DEMAND FOR THE
PROPERTY

With regard to the question of private development of the
airport, all of the appraisers who testified in this case agreed
that there was no demand for any private economic development of
that

property.

For

example,

Messrs.

Fujii

and

Webber

both

testified that the proximity of the airport does not warrant any
economic adjustment to the property because of the lack of demand
25

for development use.

The County's Development Director testified

that the County was willing to lease property on the airport itself
for almost nothing in order to promote some development on the
airport.

At the time of the taking, no developer had showed any

interest

in

addition,

leasing

whatever

or developing

any

of

demand

be

inferred

might

the

property.
for

In

private

development, Ferrebee offers no analysis of what that value might
be.
The evidence of an enhancement value offered by Ferrebee's
appraisers does not address private development, no comparable are
offered and no analysis is given.

Instead, the only analysis given

relates to the "premium" that a county can be expected to pay for
property needed to expand its airport.
Based on the fact that there is no evidence of any economic
demand for the property for commercial or industrial development of
the property use and that Ferrebee has not provided any analysis
which would address enhanced value based on private demand, an
enhancement value for the property is unwarranted, and against the
clear weight of evidence.
(2) THE COUNTY'S NEED FOR THE PROPERTY FOR EXPANSION OF
THE AIRPORT CANNOT AS A MATTER OF LAW BE CONSIDERED
IN DETERMINING FAIR MARKET VALUE.
The

substance

of

Ferrebee's

analysis

to

support

an

"enhancement value" of the property relates to an alleged "premium"
that can be exacted from Tooele County because the property will be
needed

for use in completing

Airport.

the design

All of the comparable
26

sales

for the Tooele Valley
information

provided

in

support

of

Ferrebee's

"airport

enhancement

factor"

involved

municipalities)acquiring land by condemnation or under threat of
condemnation
Ferrebee's

for expansion

contention

of

their

he

is

that

airports.

entitled

to

Fundamentally,
consider

Tooele

County's need for the property to complete the airport is contrary
to

well

accepted

legal

principles

of

condemnation

law.

In

addition, the evidence Ferrebee provided to support his claim is
incompetent

and

hearsay

evidence

which

should

not

have

been

admitted by the lower court.
(a) ANY INCREASED VALUE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE
COUNTY'S NEED FOR THE PROPERTY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED
IN ARRIVING AT A FAIR MARKET VALUE.
In the lower court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
the court found that "at the time the County planned construction
of the Tooele County Airport, Ferrebee owned eighty (80) acres of
ground in the are of the planned airport," R.409, and that the
"County's original Airport Layout Plan for the airport included
approximately sixty-eight (68) acres of Ferrebee's 80 acre parcel.
Approximately twelve (12) of Ferrebee's acres were not included in
the County's original plan."

R.409.

Evidence provided to the

lower court indicated that the 12 acres of land not originally
planned in the original plan consisted of a 100 foot long strip the
length of his property boundary.

R.435, at 148.

That 12 acre

piece of property was deemed an uneconomic remainder, and Tooele
County understood that under the requirements of the FAA it was had
to acquire that property.

R.435, at 160, 207-8, 238.

Thus, from

the inception of the Tooele Valley Airport, the Ferrebee property
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was always considered to be property that would be taken for use in
the airport.
Under generally recognized principals of condemnation law,
where property is understood

to be within the boundaries of a

public project, the fact that the property will eventually be taken
by the public use cannot be taken into consideration in determining
its value.
If the exact location of the improvement is
known from the outset, the property that will
serve as the site of the improvement will not
be subject to any rise or fall in values.
This is so because the property is bound to be
taken
if the improvement
is, in fact,
constructed, and, therefore, it can neither
suffer from, nor enjoy, the effects of the
existence
of
the
improvement
in
its
neighborhood.
4 Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain, §12 B.17[2] p. 12b-212.

Under

Utah Law it is specifically recognized that any enhancement or
decrease

in

value

attributable

to

the

purpose

for which

the

property is being condemned can not be considered in determining
the fair market value of the property.

Redevelopment Agency of

Salt Lake City v. Grutter, 734 P.2d 434 (Utah 1986).
In Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 347 P.2d
862 (Utah 1959), the Utah Supreme Court considered the question of
the valuation of property which was being condemned for use in the
enlargement

of

the

Pineview

Reservoir

in

Ogden

Valley.

The

condemnor in that case argued that the "value of the property for
condemnation purposes should be determined without consideration of
the fact that the condemnor has entered the market and planned
improvements . . . the condemnor should not be allowed an advantage
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from the fact that the condemnor is improving the area and the
latter be required to pay a higher price and thus in effect suffer
a penalty because of its own improvements." .Id./ at 863 (footnotes
omitted).

The Supreme Court rejected that approach stating that

"the condemnee is entitled to the fair market value of his property
at the time of the service of the summons in the condemnation
proceeding as provided by statute; and all factors bearing upon
such value, that any prudent purchaser would take into account at
that time, should be given consideration including any potential
development in the area reasonably to be expected."

JEd. (footnotes

omitted).
Thereafter, in Redevelopment Agency v. Grutter, supra, the
Utah Supreme Court repudiated the position taken in Weber Basin
Water Conservancy District v. Ward, and held that "in condemnation
proceedings, any enhancement or decrease in value attributable to
the purpose for which the property is being condemned, shall be
excluded

in determining the fair market value of the property.

This rule conforms to legislative intent and to sound policy."

Id.

at 437.
The holding in Grutter is in conformance with the holdings of
the United States Supreme Court.

In United States v. Cors , 337

U.S. 325, 333-334 (1949) the United States Supreme Court stated
that
It is not fair that the government be required
to pay the enhanced price which its demand
alone has created. That enhancement reflects
elements of the value that was created by the
urgency of its need for the article. It does
not reflect what a "willing buyer would pay in
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cash to a willing seller" (citations omitted)
in a fair market. It represents what can be
expected from the government whose demands in
the emergency have created a seller's market.
In this situation, as in the case of land
included
in a proposed
project
of
the
government,
the
enhanced
value
reflects
speculation as to what the government can be
compelled to pay. That is a holdup value, and
not a fair market value.
That is a value
which the government itself created and hence,
in fairness, should not be required to pay.
Commentators have also concurred that enhancement created by
the project itself should not be considered for the purposes of
valuation.

In Condemnation Procedures and Techniques, the author

states that "in the majority of the cases, the determination of
whether enhancement will be allowed or denied is made to turn on
what some courts have termed the 'possibility of inclusion'

test

or rule . . . Broadly speaking, it may be said that appreciation in
value will be denied if it is probably the lands "ill be included
in the project, and enhancement in value will be allowed if it is
not probable that the lands will be included

in the project."

Rohan and Reskin, Condemnation Procedures and Techniques, §8.06[7]
Page 8-204.4.
Utah, therefore, is in line with the majority of jurisdictions
which would deny any enhancement value created by the expansion or
improvement of the public use where it was always anticipated that
property would eventually be acquired

for the public use.

The

testimony of Ferrebee's appraisers indicates that it is this very
type of enhancement value that they were looking at in determining
the amount of the adjustment to be made for the proximity of the
property to the airport.

All of the comparable sales that were
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provided by Ferrebee's appraisers to substantiate a enhancement
factor were properties that were taken in condemnation, or under
threat of condemnation and were meant to show what

additional

amount or "premium" a municipality would be willing to pay for
property needed in the expansion of its projects.
Ferrebee's appraisers, and particularly the appraisal of Phil
Cook, incorrectly based their valuation of Ferrebee's property on
Tooele

County's

continuing

need

for

the property.

Where

the

determination of the fair market value of Ferrebee's property is
based on such an improper premise that determination of fair market
value should be rejected.
(b)
EVIDENCE OF COMPARABLE BASED ON PROPERTY
ACQUIRED THROUGH CONDEMNATION OR UNDER THREAT OF
CONDEMNATION IS INADMISSABLE.
The Courts have uniformly denied the admissability of values
based on forced sales or sales under the threat of condemnation.
Based upon a variety or reasons, e.g., that such payments are in
the nature of compromise to avoid the expense and uncertainty of
litigation and so are not fair indications of market value, that
such evidence complicates
misleading,

and,

the record, confuses the issues, is

especially

in

a

condemnation

cases,

raises

collateral issues as to the conditions under which such sales were
made, the overwhelming view of the Courts and commentators is that
the

sum

paid

by

the

condemnor

for

similar

lands,

condemnation proceedings have not begun, is inadmissable.
Co. v. United States, 231 F.2d 37, 40-41

even

if

Slattery

(C.A. 5 1956); United

States v. Bailey, 115 F.2d 433, 434 (C.A. 5, 1940); Evans v. United
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States, 326 F.2d 827, 831 (C.A. 8, 1964); Hickey v. United States,
208 F.2d 269, 275 (C.A. 3, 1953), cert. den. 347 U.S. 919; Murdock
v. United States, 160 F.2d 358, 362 (C.A. 8, 1947); United States
v. 13,255.53 Acres of Land in New Jersey, 158 F.2d 874, 877 (C.A.
3, 1946); United States v. Foster, 131 F.2d 3, 5 (C.A. 8, 1942),
cert. den. 318 U.S. 767; United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Reynolds,
115 F.2d 294, 296 (C.A. 5, 1940).
The reasoning which forbids consideration of forced sales
also renders it incompetent for either party to put in
evidence the amount paid by the condemnor to the owners
of neighboring lands and taken at the same time, and as
part of the same proceedings, however similar they may be
to that in controversy (irrespective of whether the
payment was made as a result of a voluntary settlement,
an award, or the verdict of a jury).
The right of an
owner to recover just compensation for the taking of his
land are not to be measured by the generosity, necessity,
estimated advantage, or fear or dislike of condemnation
which may have induced others to part with the title to
their property, or to relinquish claims for damages by
reason of injuries thereto.
If a sale is made to a
condemnor that is about to institute proceedings if it
cannot acquire the land by purchase at a satisfactory
price, the amount paid is not a fair test of market
value.
4 Nichols, supra, §12.3113 [2], p. 12-178.
Almost

without

exception

the

comparable

sales

used

by

Ferrebee's appraisers were properties either taken by condemnation
or under threat of condemnation.

These properties are not a proper

basis for any part of the calculation of fair market value.

The

lower court's failure to exclude the comparable sales which reflect
acquisitions taken by condemnation or under threat of condemnation
is an abuse of discretion.

The lower courts finding of fair market

value based on Ferrebee's appraisal's which use such comparable,
including the appraisal of Phil Cook should be rejected.
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(c)
FERREBEE'S EVIDENCE REGARDING THE ALLEGED
ENHANCEMENT FACTOR IS BASED ON INADMISSABLE HEARSAY
WHICH THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO EXCLUDE
The

evidence

as

to

enhancement

value

was

objected

to

repeatedly because it was based on impermissible hearsay evidence.
R.439, at 768; R.440, at 934.
ruled

counsels objections

The lower court erroneously over-

and permitted

the admittance of the

evidence.
After

a

long

history

of

deep

soul

searching

Courts

now

generally admit over objections of hearsay and best evidence facts
and data gathered by an expert which he uses as a basis for his
opinion.

12 ALR 3d 1064, Rule 703, Utah Rules of Evidence.

In

this instance, however, what is being objected to are not the
"facts

and

data"

which

were

assembled

and

analyzed

by

the

appraiser, but the use of opinions of out-of-court witnesses who
opined as to the value of "similar" property for comparison with
specifically identified comparable sales. It is these out-of-court
opinions which can not be impeached by cross examination and which
allow the appraiser to shield his conclusions from full examination
and scrutiny.1
Comparable
comparability.'

sales

must

"meet

the

test

of

'reasonable

That is, that . . . factors exist in sufficient

similarity that the sale can fairly be regarded as having some
probative value in arriving at a proper appraisal of the property."

An expert witnesses opinion must be his own, he cannot
act as a mere conduit for the opinions of others.
Warren v.
Waterville Urban Renewal Authority, 235 A.2d 295, cert denied, 390
U.S. 1006.
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Redevelopment A Q . of Salt Lake City v. Mitsui, Inc., 522 P. 2d 1370,
1373 (Utah 1974).

Factors to be considered are:

proximity;

(2)

similarity

situation,

usability,

in

and

the

quality,

improvements

on

(1) geographical
size,

the

character,

property;

(3)

proximity of the time of sale; and (4) similarity in the condition
of sale.

Brinkerhoff, supra, at 716.

Since land is unique and

that it is impossible to find an identical piece of property for
comparison purposes, it is incumbent upon the appraiser to make
adjustments

to comparable

sales

to demonstrate

similarity.

Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain, Section 21.3[1], p. 231.

5

If an

appraiser "fails to give property consideration or weight to any
particular

factor that goes to the credibility and not to the

admissibility of his evidence.

If it has deficiencies, they are

subject to exposure or cross-examination . . . ."

Mitsui, supra,

at 1373(emphasis added).
In this case the weighing of the various comparability factors
was

made

by

individuals,

whose

qualifications

to

make

those

decisions were admittedly unknown, and who were not witnesses in
the case.

The "similarity" of the property used to compare the

various airport sales with is the key to establishing the alleged
value of the airport influence.

That comparison process, however,

was completely foreclosed from examination because the individuals
making that assessment were not before the court, and yet their
opinions were admitted in evidence.
On cross examination of Ferrebee's appraisers concerning their
analysis

of

the

comparable

sales
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at

arriving

at

the

airport

influence factor, none of the comparability factors could be tested
or examined since the appraisers had no specific information about
them and simply relied on hearsay opinions of others as to the
"similarity"

of

the

properties.

Thus,

the

exposure

of

the

deficiency in analysis was impossible and the work of the appraiser
was shielded from review by reliance on the opinion of others.
These hearsay opinions and conclusions should have been excluded by
the lower court, and the lower court abused its discretion in
permitting hearsay opinions into evidence where their reliability
is at issue and could not be examined.
The lower court abused its discretion in failing to exclude
the hearsay
"airport

evidence

enhancement

presented

in an attempt

value."

Furthermore,

to establish

the

lower

an

court's

Finding of Fact and Conclusions of Law based on an appraisal which
relies on incompetent evidence should be rejected.

County of Los

Angeles v. Fans, 304 P.2d 257, 261 (Cal. 1957).
II.

CONCLUSION
The lower court erred in relying on the Cook appraisal.

Its

conclusion as to the fair market value of Ferrebee's property is
not supported by the clear weight of the evidence, and the lower
court's conclusion of law that the property is entitled to an
enhancement value is plain error.
Ferrebee's appraisers proposed a "premium" to be exacted from
Tooele County because of the County's need for the property to
complete the airport.
attributable

to

the

The law in Utah is clear that enhancement
purpose

for which
35

the

property

is

being

condemned can not be used in determining fair market value.

Since

that

their

is

exactly

what

Ferrebee's

appraisers

proposed,

appraisals and finding premised thereon must be rejected.
Finally,

the

evidence

used

by

Ferrebee's

appraiser's

to

establish its "premium" is incompetent since it was based, almost
exclusively,
threat of
support

of

on

sales

completed

condemnation.
the

"premium"

through

condemnation

or

under

In addition, the evidence offered
included

as

the

essential

in

element

impermissible hearsay opinions of out-of-court witnesses.

That

evidence should have been stricken by the lower court.
The findings and conclusions of the lower court should be
rejected and the matter remanded for the entry of findings which
are consistent with the appraisals provided by Tooele County.
DATED this

^ 6 r ^ d a y of July, 1991.

STOKER & THOMAS

David B. Thomas
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby verifies that on

the

^k

day of

July, 1991, a tru^ and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Evan A. Schmutz
Holme Roberts & Owen
50 South Main, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
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A D D E N D U M

Evan A. Schmutz (USB #3860)
Robert A, Goodman (USB #4580)
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH
Attorneys for DEFENDANT
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT
84101
TELEPHONE: (801) 521-3200
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
OF TOOELE COUNTY,

)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

)

JOSEPH WILEY FERREBEE,
Trustee of the Ferrebee
1976 Family Trust,

)
)
)
)
)

Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. CV-86-156
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

The above-entitled matter came on for trial before the
Honorable

Homer F. Wilkinson on July 11 through July 14, 1989,

and concluded on August 29, 1989.

The plaintiff, Board of County

Commissioners of Tooele County (the "County"), was represented by
David

B.

Thomas;

the

defendant,

Joseph

Wiley

Ferrebee

("Ferrebee"), was represented by Evan A. Schmutz and Robert A.
Goodman.

The Court, having heard the arguments of counsel, and

having received the evidence, rendered its bench ruling on August
29,

1989, at

the conclusion

of

the

trial.

After hearings on

proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law held on January
24 and March 15, 1990, the Court now makes the following Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In

the

1970 ! s ,

the

County

devised

a

plan

to

construct the Tooele County Airport near Erda, Utah.
2.

At the time the County planned construction of the

Tooele County Airport/ Ferrebee owned eighty (80) acres of ground
in the area of the planned airport.
3.
airport

The County's original Airport Layouts Plan for the

included

approximately

sixty-eight

Ferrebee's eighty (80) acre parcel.
the

Ferrebee

acres were not

(68)

acres

of

Approximately twelve (12) of

included

in the County's original

plan.
4.

On May 16, 1986/ after the initial construction of

the airport/ the County filed this action to condemn the remaining forty-three (43) acres of the Ferrebee property (the "Subject
Property").
5.

The 1986 condemnation was a complete and separate

action from the 1975 condemnation.

Federal

6.

With

and

State

respect

*

to • the—1986—condemnation—and

Relocation

Acts,

the

County

failed

to

the
act

expeditiously to acquire the Subject Property by negotiation.
7.

With respect to the provisions of the Federal and

State Relocation Acts, the County failed to notify Ferrebee that
it was having the Subject Property appraised, and failed to give
Ferrebee or his representatives an opportunity to accompany the
County's

appraisers

during

their

Property.

- 2 -

inspection

of

the

Subject

8.

With respect to the provisions of the Federal and

State Relocation Acts, the County failed to offer to Ferrebee the
lowest appraisal amount for purchase of the property.
9.
State

With respect to the provisions of the Federal and

Relocation

Acts,

the

County

failed

to

make

a

full

disclosure to Ferrebee of information which was the basis for the
amount used by the County in negotiations with Ferrebee.
10.

The

comparable

sales

used

by

the

County's

appraisers, and particularly the Terracor sales, were not competent adjusted comparables.
11.

The Terracor sales used by the County's appraisers

involved depressed sales arising out of circumstances under which
Terracor was trying
amount

of

land

constituting

on

the

to get rid of its land by dumping
the market.

Terracor

a large

Consequently, the transactions

sales

are

not

competent

comparable

sales.
12.
is the

best

The appraisal of Phil Cook, Ferrebee's appraiser,
estimate

of the

fair

market

value of the Subject

Property, and is adopted by the Court as the true market value of
the Subject Property.
13.

As

set

forth in the Cook appraisal, the agricul-

tural value of the Subject Property was $52,000 on May 16, 1986.
14.

Ferrebee had a verbal option with Floyd Walters to

acquire access to the Subject Property for $500 per acre.
15.
access

to

Ferrebee

entered

into a written option to acquire

the Subject Property at a stated value of $5,000 per

- 3 -

acre.

The Court finds that this $5,000 per acre value for

access

to the Subject Property was binding on Ferrebee and, based upon
such value, adopts a total cost to acquire access of $19,240.
16.

As indicated in the Cook appraisal, the fair market

value of the property is enhanced by its proximity to the initial
construction of the airport.
17.

As set forth in the Cook appraisal, the fair market

value of the property is the base agricultural value of the land
($52,000), less the cost of access (determined by the Court to be
$19,240), plus an enhancement of $40,950 or 125 percent of the
adjusted agricultural base value for the property's proximity to
the airport, based upon competent comparable sales of land adjacent to other rural airports, for a total fair market value of
$74,000.
18.

Ferrebee paid taxes on the Subject Property in the

amount of $826.31 after the County took possession of the Subject
Property.
19.

The

County

deposited

with

the

Court

the sum

of

$9,004.87 at about the time of condemnation.
20.

Ferrebee expended reasonable and necessary costs in

this action in the amount of $307.32.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The Utah Relocation Assistance Act, Utah Code Sec.

57-12-1, et. seq. does not apply to this case.

- 4 -

2.

The

Uniform

Relocation

Assistance

and

Land

Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 4601, et. seq.
does not apply to this case.
3.
value

of

the

Ferrebee
Subject

is entitled
Property,

to be

as

paid

the

discounted

by

fair
the

access and as enhanced by its proximity to the airport.

market
cost

of

The fair

market value thus calculated is $74,000.
4.
the

Subject

Ferrebee is entitled
Property

after

the

to a refund of taxes paid on

County

took

possession

in the

amount of $826.31.
5.

Ferrebee

is

entitled

to

his

reasonable

and

necessary costs in the amount of $307.32.
6.
entitled
percent

Pursuant

to

Utah

Code

Sec. 78-34-9, Ferrebee

is

to interest on the sum of $64,995.13 at the rate of 8
per

annum

from May

16, 1986

to the date

of entry

of

Judgment.
7.

Ferrebee is entitled

to interest at the rate of 12

percent per annum on the total amount of Judgment from the date
of entry of Judgment thereafter.
DATED this £ &

day of April, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

lomer F. Wilkinson
District Judge

- 5 -

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I
this

\l-

hereby

certify

that

I caused

to be

hand-delivered

day of April, 1990, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing to:
David B. Thomas
STOKER & THOMAS
311 South State
Street,
Suite
Salt-Lake City, UT
84111
Attorneys for PLAINTIFF
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HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN
Evan A. Schmutz (#3860)
50 South Main, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Telephone: (801) 521-5800
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR TOOELE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS :
OF TOOELE COUNTY,
:
Plaintiff,

:

JUDGMENT

:

vs.

./

-)/-_//

U -<->-'

:

/ •'

JOSEPH WILEY FERREBEE,
Trustee of the Ferrebee
197 6 Family Trust,
Defendant-

:
:
:

Civil No. CV-86156
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson

:

The above entitled matter came on for trial before the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, sitting without a jury, on July 11
through July 14, 1989, and concluded on August 29, 1989-

The

plaintiff, Board of County Commissioners of Tooele County (the
"County"), was represented by David B. Thomas; the defendant,
Joseph Wiley Ferrebee ("Ferrebee"), was represented by Evan A.
Schmutz and Robert A. Goodman.

The Court, having heard the

arguments of counsel, and having received the evidence, rendered
its bench ruling at the conclusion of trial, on August 29, 1989,
and following several hearings, entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on April 30, 1990.

Being fully advised in the

premises and good cause appearing therefor,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that defendant
Joseph Wiley Ferrebee shall have judgment against plaintiff Board

of County Commissioners of Tooele County as follows:
1.

For the fair market value of the Subject Property in

the amount of $74,000;
2.

For a refund of taxes paid on the Subject Property in

the amount of $826.31;
3.

For necessary costs in the amount of $307.32;

4.

For interest on the sum of $64,995.13 at the rate of 8%

per annum from May 16, 19 86 to the date of the entry of judgment,
and at the rate of 12% from the date of judgment thereafter;
5per

annum

judgment

For interest on the sum of $826.31 at the rate of 10%
from July
and

at

1,

1989

the rate

of

until

the date

12% per

annum

of
from

the

entry

of

date

of

except

as

the

judgment thereafter;
6.

Each

party

shall

bear

their

own

costs

specifically provided for herein, and their own attorneys' fees.
DATED this

/ (

day of June, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

-0^—f^Z^
^Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson
/District Judge
Approved as to Form:
STOKER & THOMAS

2

.

